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Friends in high places: government–industry relations in public sector 
house-building during Britain’s tower block era 
 
Abstract 
Britain’s high-rise public housing era is widely seen as a serious social policy mistake. We 
show that the problems associated with this housing format were known to policy makers at 
an early stage, while tower blocks were also substantially more expensive, both from the 
perspective of central, and local, government. Conservatives governments championed high-
rise mainly owing to the political advantages of urban containment. Major building 
contractors then used their close links with (central and local) policy-makers to aggressively 
lobby for high-rise `system building’, as their expertise in this field enabled them to dominate 
the sector and exclude local competitors. 
 
Key words: Housing, Construction, Government-industry Relations, Contracting, Corruption 
 
Introduction 
In common with many western industrialised nations, Britain embarked on a major 
programme of mass public housing from the 1950s, with tower blocks constituting a 
substantial and increasing proportion of new units. Central government established the `rules 
of the game’ for the programme, and provided major financial subsidies, while local councils 
organised the actual development, through contracts with (overwhelmingly) private building 
contractors.
1
 However, by the early 1970s tower blocks had fallen into disrepute and the 
volume of construction was declining sharply both in absolute terms and as a proportion of 
Page 1 of 39
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fbsh  Email: FBSH-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk
Business History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
2 
 
all new public sector housing. This study explores the rise and decline of high-rise public 
housing in Britain, focusing on the interactions between the three main agencies involved in 
their development – central government, local government, and a small group of national 
contractors who received most of the building contracts. 
Using hitherto unexploited archival sources, including Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government (MHLG) and Treasury records, we show that, contrary to some influential 
accounts, the key ministries involved with the programme were sceptical both about the 
potential for high-rise industrialised building to become more cost-effective than traditional 
low-rise housing, and the ability of this new building form to meet the needs of – particularly 
– families with children. These concerns were evident from the early days of the high-rise 
boom, while subsequent experience tended to reinforce them. 
Tower blocks were initially justified within Whitehall as a means to prevent 
`overspill’ from urban centres into suburbs or other greenfield areas, which threatened to 
erode Conservative support in key marginal constituencies. Corralling urban working-class 
households within urban boundaries took priority over `value for money’ criteria for 
evaluating housing projects. This enabled other vested interests, especially large-scale 
building contractors, to lobby for tower blocks, built using industrialised methods, and thus 
gain an increasing share of public housing contracts - as expertise in high-rise system-
building was limited to a relatively small number of large (typically national) firms. 
Such lobbying increasingly involved the cultivation of close relationships with 
politicians and public officials, ranging from the provision of specialist advice to `gifts’ and 
other incentives. By the late 1960s corruption in the awarding of tower block contracts had 
become ubiquitous, as illustrated in a series of high-profile corruption scandals which, 
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together with the introduction of stronger cost yardsticks by national government, and the 
Ronan Point disaster, brought tower blocks into disrepute. 
This paper also addresses three major `myths’ regarding the rationale for high-rise 
flats. The first - that high-rise offered a low-cost solution at a time of acute housing shortage - 
is largely a popular, rather than scholarly, myth, though some of the literature argues that 
policy-makers perceived the potential for major cost-savings, or even that such savings were 
achieved.
2
 The second myth is that high-rise was an inevitable consequence of the town and 
country planning legislation of the 1940s, which allegedly prevented `overspill’ development 
into rural areas.
3
  We show that the creation of green belts and the blocking of urban 
boundary extensions was in fact a deliberate strategy of successive Conservative 
governments, to prevent overspill.  Moreover, in most cases, target housing densities for the 
urban sites chosen could have been achieved using conventional housing or low-rise flats. 
The final myth is that local authorities were compelled to accept tower blocks on cost 
grounds, not because they were inherently more cost-effective, but because they carried much 
larger subsidies. We show that, even with the greater proportional subsidies per flat, high-rise 
was still a more expensive option for local authorities. 
 After briefly reviewing previous studies, the paper charts the evolution of British 
high-rise policy until the late 1960s, when the policy fell into disrepute. This is followed by 
an examination of the cost-effectiveness of high flats, using contemporary civil service 
analyses. We conclude that policy-makers’ enthusiasm for high flats can only be 
convincingly explained in terms of Conservative Party political interests and the personal 
financial interests of local (and sometimes national) politicians and officials. 
 
Explanations for the high-rise boom 
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  The three main studies of Britain’s high-rise era were published before most relevant 
MHLG and Treasury records became available and were largely based on interviews and 
published sources. The first, Patrick Dunleavy’s 1981 monograph, The Politics of Mass 
Housing in Britain, argues that, - while there were strong pressures for the adoption of high-
rise flats – advocated on architectural, technological, and industrial concentration grounds - 
there were also strong arguments against, including the high costs and unpopularity of this 
building form and the reduced amenity provided. He concludes that the sum of these 
pressures did not appear to justify the widespread adoption of high-rise solutions and explains 
this `rationality deficit’ in terms of the strength of advocacy for urban containment by the 
suburban middle-class and rural upper-class, organised in the Conservative Party. Policy was 
then legitimised by being presented as a `technological shortcut to social change,’ with public 
statements stressing the alleged productivity advantages of high-rise, `system-built’ housing.
4
 
Dunleavy’s thesis was challenged by two subsequent studies. The first of these, Brian 
Finnimore’s Houses from the Factory, argues that system-built high flats represented a 
genuine, but ill-judged, attempt to achieve `not only a revolution in building methods, but… 
better quality housing,’ thus representing a failed welfare state initiative, rather than any 
triumph of Conservative politics.
5
 A more extreme challenge to the Dunleavy thesis was 
advanced in Glendenning and Muthesius’s Tower Block, which places responsibility for high 
rise flats on, `powerful local authorities [who] determinedly set about the task of keeping 
control of their own housing densities, by combining slum-clearance with a building policy at 
variance with Government-endorsed decentralism: the massed development of high flats on 
their own territory…’
6
 These were also said to be responding to the town and Country 
planning legislation of the 1940s, which - in conjunction with a powerful `town planning 
establishment’ - created a `land trap’ for councils wishing to expand their urban boundaries.
7
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Glendenning and Muthesius identify the key actors in this process as `crusading’ 
councillors, driven by a combination of determination to maximise numbers of new homes 
and considerations of `municipal power, independence, and prestige’, while exonerating 
contractors, architects, and planners from any responsibility for promoting high flats or 
delivering a sub-standard product.
8
 However, the evidence they offer, is – to put it midly – 
partial. They provide little discussion of other proposed explanations of local authorities’ 
acceptance of high-rise (for example, Tower Block has almost no discussion of corruption in 
the awarding of building contracts);  they reject claims that central government subsidies 
incentivised councils to build high (while simultaneously stating that building costs are 
excluded from their study); and they explicitly exclude the history of habitation, 
management, and maintenance of high flats, together with issues such as, `claims of structural 
inadequacy’ as being outside their remit.
9
 
 
The genesis of high-rise policy 
 Although tenement housing had been common in Scottish cities, and in much of 
Europe, there was almost no tradition of such housing in most parts of England and Wales, 
where the dominant urban dwelling form was the two-storey house. Similarly the vast 
majority of new inter-war homes, both for the public and private sector, were suburban semi-
detached houses or short terraces.
10
 Yet, despite the huge popularity of semi-detached 
housing, during the 1930s an influential section of Britain’s architectural and planning elite 
became enamoured with modernist architecture, championed by Le Corbusier and the 
Bauhaus school, which found concrete expression in a number of high density mass public 
housing projects such as the Vienna workers’ flats. These were seen as being superior to 
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suburban semis both on social grounds - fostering more cohesive communities - and aesthetic 
grounds, providing monumental buildings that would impact the urban skyline.11  
During the 1940s such developments were strongly advocated by the architectural and 
planning professions, as a technocratic fix to the post-war housing problem - using 
industrialised techniques to undertake mass housing projects that were said to offer both cost 
and social benefits.
12
 However, the Ministry of Works’ initial optimism regarding the cost-
effectiveness of mass-produced pre-fabricated housing soon proved ill-founded, with 15 of 
the 19 systems in production requiring (often substantial) subsidies to make them competitive 
with traditional techniques. The termination of subsidies in 1948, together with shortages of 
structural steel, led to a rapid return to conventional housing.
13
 Meanwhile flats and 
maisonettes represented only around 10 percent of new local authority dwellings in England 
and Wales over 1946-50, with virtually no high-rise blocks being built.
14
  
It was the Conservative governments of 1951-64 that launched Britain’s mass housing 
era,  the contribution of flats to new municipal homes rising to 22 percent during 1951-5, 35 
percent over 1956-60, and 48 percent for 1961-5.
15
 Meanwhile blocks of ten or more stories 
comprised 9 percent of new public sector housing during 1953-59 and reached an all-time 
peak of 28 percent during 1960-64. The shift towards high flats was partly justified by the 
need to prevent urban sprawl and conserve rural land – though as MHLG records show, the 
underlying aim was to preserve the political complexion of rural and suburban areas and 
avoid alienating their voters.  
Inter-war overspill housing developments, such as the London County Council’s `out-
county’ estates beyond the County’s borders, or Manchester’s Wythenshawe `satellite town’ 
had faced substantial opposition from established local residents.
16
 Several of the Attlee 
governments’ `new towns’ had also faced vehement local opposition, while there was 
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considerable antipathy in outer-London, rural Warwickshire, and Cheshire, to potential 
overspill developments from inner-London, Birmingham, and Manchester, which took on a 
party political edge given the divisions of these counties into Labour urban councils and 
Conservative county councils.
17
 
While some accounts stress the importance of the Attlee governments’ planning 
legislation as a key constraint on overspill development, only one green belt was formally 
proposed before 1952, for London. It was the following Conservative governments who 
effectively blocked overspill development, through three main measures: the creation of 
provincial green belts; Ministerial refusals to approve urban boundary extensions, and an 
informal suspension of the New Towns programme in England and Wales. The 
Conservatives’ 1953 Housing White Paper emphasised the need to locate new housing, 
especially for slum clearance, within existing urban areas and support green belts around 
major cities.
18
 In April 1955 the Housing Minister, Duncan Sandys, told the Commons, `I am 
convinced that, for the well-being of our people and for the preservation of the countryside, 
we have a clear duty to do all we can to prevent the further unrestricted sprawl of the great 
cities…I am accordingly asking all planning authorities concerned to [consider] proposals for 
the creation of clearly defined green belts.’
19
 Many county councils seized on the 1955 Green 
Belts circular as a means to check expansion of their (often Labour-voting) cities, while 
successive Conservative governments typically rejected, or restricted, proposals for urban 
boundary extensions.
20
 Government also blocked longer-distance overspill – via new town 
development – by failing to designate any further new towns in England and Wales during 
the 1950s.  
This policy fostered dramatic growth in the proportion of new public sector housing 
comprised of flats, together with increased emphasis on industrialised building methods. 
Proponents claimed that this was a new technology, that offered astounding productivity 
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gains, by transforming building into relatively simple assembly operations for components 
pre-fabricated off-site in factories.
21
 In fact these methods were long-established, but had 
been beset by the sort of problems they were to become synonymous with in the 1960s. 
Industrialised building, based on concrete prefabrication, dates from the 1860s and had been 
introduced to Britain by the turn of the century.
22
 Various public housing contractors had 
employed these techniques in the aftermath of the First World War. However, most of the 
systems demonstrated structural problems such as cracking and dampness, usually 
necessitating expensive repairs within 10-15 years, problems which re-surfaced when Walter 
Gropius applied similar techniques at the Törten housing estate at Dessau from 1926.
23
  
There were three British post-war government drives to encourage industrialised 
building; in 1946-48 (`prefab’ houses), 1952-54, and in the early and mid-1960s. The first 
two were partly a reflection of scarcities in traditional building materials and crafts, while the 
third was more explicitly justified in terms of revolutionising building productivity – despite 
mounting evidence that industrialised building methods not only failed to offer major 
productivity advantages, but had higher costs per dwelling than conventional techniques.
24
  
Urban councils were incentivised, via subsidies and pressure (such as threats to 
withhold the loan sanction for the necessary development funds) to build at high densities 
within their existing urban boundaries. A MHLG Housing Policy Committee document of 
July 1953 noted that to promote such development, increased subsidies for multi-storey flats 
should be considered.
25
 However, there was not, as yet, any strong specific commitment to 
`high-rise’ per se. In 1954 25 per cent of local authority homes were built by industrialised 
methods, though only about 20 per cent of new local authority houses in England and Wales 
were flats and of these only around a quarter were in blocks of five or more storeys.
26
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Despite their advocacy by influential architects, planners, central government, and 
some of Britain’s largest contractors, there was well-informed contemporary opposition to 
both high flats and industrialised building. This included a group of, generally older, 
architects and planners led by F.J. Osborn, who still advocated the use of garden city-type 
suburban housing estates.
27
 Some politicians also railed against the flats programme.
 
In 
March 1953 Conservative M.P. Henry Brooke made a speech to the Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors in which he noted that flats were not a suitable environment for families 
with children; houses were generally cheaper to build; and councils only chose flats on 
account of their higher subsidies.
28
 Such arguments indeed weighed heavily with local 
authorities; in 1955, when the industrialised building drive was relaxed, the proportion of 
industrialised building fell sharply, reflecting both contractors’ higher tender prices and the 
unpopularity of the new methods with councils and tenants.
29
 
High flat development was boosted by the 1956 Housing Subsidies Act, which 
introduced a new per dwelling subsidy for flats, based on the number of storeys. Annual 
subsidies rose steeply up to the sixth storey and then increased by £1.75 per additional storey. 
Flats of six storeys would receive more than twice the subsidy for houses and fifteen-storey 
flats almost three times as much.
30
 Another change introduced in 1956 was the 
discontinuation of the requirement that local authorities must make a rate fund contribution to 
the annual cost of housing, equivalent to half the government subsidy (implying that councils 
would bear at least a third of the costs of high-rise flats directly, together with any adverse 
impact on rent levels). This reduced the incentive for councils to keep costs down and - in 
conjunction with the new progressive subsidy for higher flats – substantially increased local 
authorities’ incentives to build high.
31
  
The early 1960s witnessed the start of a third industrialised building wave, 
championed by Sir Keith Joseph – heir to the Bovis property fortune – who had been 
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appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the MHLG following the 1959 election. In August 1962 
he was promoted to Minister of Housing and Local Government and spoke enthusiastically at 
the October 1962 Conservative Party conference about the potential of `new building 
techniques’ to speed up slum clearance and redevelopment.
32
 
During this third phase high flats were often used even when target housing densities 
could have been met via conventional housing. This was typically justified on aesthetic 
grounds or the need to incorporate `mixed development’. However, Phil Jones found that this 
sometimes reflected a desire to award the contract to a large building contractor with whom 
the relevant council had forged a close relationship (as industrialised high-rise housing was 
much less vulnerable to competition from local builders than traditional housing).
33
 
Prefabrication methods were only found to be at all cost-competitive for high rise flats, which 
were in turn 35 – 85 per cent more expensive than low-rise dwellings.
34
  
The third industrialised building wave witnessed greater use of `hard’ industrialised 
building methods, using pre-cast concrete components manufactured off-site. These 
demanded a level of precision (both for their off-site prefabrication and on-site fitting) that 
was often beyond the competence of the unskilled labourers who were substituted for 
traditional building crafts. Poorly fabricated and/or fitted components contributed to the high 
maintenance costs of many 1960s tower blocks.
35
 Growing use of pre-cast components was 
accompanied by an upsurge in `package deal’ contracts – where contractors tendered not only 
for construction work, but for the professional services of architectural design and 
engineering consultancy traditionally undertaken by separate parties.
36
 By 1964 some 46 per 
cent of all new public housing in England and Wales (excluding the London County Council 
and direct labour contracts) was undertaken under negotiated or package-deal contracts; a 
figure that rose to 55 per cent in 1966-8, before falling sharply to 28 per cent by 1970.
37
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Policy under Labour 
Labour’s October 1964 election victory was assisted by an ambitious commitment to 
achieve around 500,000  housing starts per annum by 1969, mainly through an expanded 
council housing programme. This responded to a major housing shortage, renewed concerns 
regarding homelessness, and malpractice - or even criminal behaviour - by private sector 
landlords (`Rachmanism’).
38
 In 1965 there was still an absolute housing shortage of around 
670,000 (based on the excess of households over dwellings), while over the next ten years the 
number of households was expected to increase by around 150,000 per annum and the 
government was committed to slum clearance and the replacement of many older dwellings, 
deemed technically obsolete.
39
  
Labour initially viewed industrialised methods as key to raising building productivity. 
To enable large forward orders for industrialised housing to be placed, local authorities were 
tasked with preparing four year programmes and grouping themselves into consortia.
 
Bizarrely, this policy was advocated despite the fact that in 1965 industrialised techniques 
were still not price-competitive with traditional building methods.
40  
Nor was there any great 
confidence among MHLG officials that they could prove more productive. A memorandum 
by Dame Eveleyn Sharp (the long-serving Permanent Secretary at MHLG) advocating their 
use, only went so far as arguing that, `with large scale production of a few selected systems, 
houses built by industrialised systems are likely to be competitive in costs and in design with 
those built by traditional methods.’
41
 Nevertheless discussion of the new methods in political 
circles and in journals such as The Economist generally took their productivity advantages for 
granted.
42
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As Robert McCutcheon has noted, in Britain (and elsewhere) once a policy of 
industrialised building had been initiated, its evaluation was not based on the claims of huge 
productivity gains which had prompted its initial adoption, `but simply whether it is 
marginally competitive with traditional building’, a process supported by continued assertion 
that this was a fundamentally `modern’ technology as distinct from `inefficient and 
backward’ traditional methods.
43
 This fitted well with Labour’s commitment to boosting 
productivity by unleashing the `white heat of this… [scientific] revolution.’
44
 It was also in 
keeping with the widespread contemporary belief that industrial concentration would boost 
productivity growth. Indeed one of the principal impacts of industrialised building was to 
concentrate public sector house-building among a small group of major contractors. A survey 
found that four firms accounted for over 50 per cent of system building completions in 1966: 
Wimpey (No-Fines system, 12,085 completions); Laing (Easi-form, 2,763); Concrete Ltd 
(Bison, 2,733) and Wates (Wates High Ris , 1,980). Indeed Wimpey’s No-Fines system 
alone accounted for eight per cent of the entire local authority housing market.
45
  Meanwhile, 
in 1965 some 40 per cent of high flats approved for tender used industrialised systems, 
compared with only 17 per cent of low flats, giving contractors a substantial incentive to 
encourage councils to build high.
46
  
System-built high flats were also claimed to offer important savings in scarce skilled 
building labour, by using pre-fabricated components produced by less skilled workers. 
However, on closer examination these arguments are shown to be deeply problematic. 
Contemporary estimates suggest that structural labour accounted for only 9 per cent of total 
building costs for traditional housing. Meanwhile proportionate labour costs were 
substantially greater for high-rise flats - one of the reasons why industrialised building 
focused on this format (because it could reduce labour costs for what was a particularly 
labour-intensive dwelling form).
47
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Once again central government pressurised local authorities to make greater use of 
system building. MHLG Circular 21/65 of April 1965 threatened to withhold loan sanction 
for municipal house-building for non-complying local authorities: `in deciding what 
programmes to approve the Minister will be influenced by the extent of the proposed use of 
industrialised methods.’
48
 Labour’s new Minister of Housing and Local Government, Richard 
Crossman, proved as strong an advocate for the new methods as his Conservative predecessor 
Keith Joseph. Crossman was notorious for his `hands-on’ approach to managing policy; for 
example, he broke with Whitehall tradition by appointing Peter Lederer, a director of 
Costains, as a `special advisor’ to help him formulate policy on industrialised building.
49
  
However, the Labour government’s enthusiasm for high-rise system building soon 
turned to disillusionment. The mid-1960s saw growing disquiet regarding the suitability and 
cost-effectiveness of system building, which, as one council representative noted, 
construction firms showed no enthusiasm for in their own private sector developments.
50
 The 
New Town Development Corporations were also becoming sceptical, noting that some 
ambitious schemes showed heavy losses per dwelling and raised, `a good deal of uneasiness 
about whether they will in fact provide acceptable living conditions. No doubt they can be let 
now, in the London [new] towns at any rate, but will they let so readily in, say, ten years’ 
time, when it is to be hoped the present acute shortage of housing will have been 
overcome?’
51
 Examples were given of flats in Crawley, Bracknell, and Basildon, which did 
not let quickly and it was noted that tower blocks required, `an actual demand. They cannot 
be put up just for architectural reasons.’
52
  Demand was said to be particularly weak for high-
rise flats designed for families, though this had not inhibited London local authorities from 
developing large numbers of such flats, with rents heavily subsidised from the rates.
53
 
 As Figure 1 shows, high-rise developments peaked in 1966 (both in absolute terms 
and as a proportion of all public housing) and then fell steeply during the rest of Labour’s 
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term in office. Indeed the Labour government had sought to cut back subsidies to high flats as 
early as 1965, though its Housing Subsidies Bill failed to reach the committee stage before 
the March 1966 general election, which delayed its passing into law until 1967.
54
 As a June 
1966 report for the Prime Minister noted, `the new subsidy system will encourage solutions 
which do not include too many tall blocks.’
55
 While the Housing Subsidies Act of 1967 still 
provided additional flat rate subsidies for buildings of 4-6 storeys and over, the progressive 
subsidy for building higher than six stories was abolished. Furthermore, the Ministry’s 
Housing Cost Yardsticks (introduced in 1963 as advisory guidelines on what prices and 
specifications MHLG would give loan sanction for) were made mandatory from 1967 and 
were strengthened.
56
 This reflected the arguments of Alec Bellamy in the Ministry’s 
Architects’ division, who had called for this measure in order to prevent unnecessary 
development of high flats.
57
  
 [Figure 1 near here] 
In conjunction with another 1967 decision, to make the more expensive Parker Morris 
housing space standards mandatory from 1969, these changes greatly reduced the financial 
viability of high-rise building, from both the local authorities’, and the developers’ 
perspectives.
58
 Although their impact is conflated with the general cut in public housing 
expenditure in the aftermath of the November 1967 devaluation, which continued for the rest 
of Labour’s time in office, the package of changes appears to have been decisive in making 
high flat development grossly uneconomic.
59
 The number of flats of five or more stories, built 
using industrialised methods, fell from over 20,000 in 1967 to 5,500 in 1969 and only 752 in 
1971.
60
 
 
The cost-effectiveness of high flat development 
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As noted above, in contrast to popular perceptions that tower blocks were a cost-
cutting measure, high flat development was more expensive than conventional housing 
(considerably so for very tall flats). According to a 1961 Alliance Building Society report, 
building costs per square foot averaged 40 shillings for houses, 45 shillings for maisonettes, 
74 shillings for eight storey flats; and 83 shillings for 12 storey flats.
61
 This is corroborated 
by unpublished official estimates. In 1958 high flats were estimated to cost over 50 per cent 
more than two storey houses, while also having much higher running and maintenance 
costs.
62
 High flats were also more expensive than low ones: the average tender price for local 
authority flats in England and Wales during the 1964/65 financial year was £3,159 per flat for 
blocks of four or more storeys, compared to only £2,045 for blocks of three or fewer 
storeys.
63
 Building in inner-urban areas did, of course, incur higher land costs, though for 
most tower-block developments the target densities could have been met using low-rise flats, 
or even conventional housing. Moreover, as Table 1 (below) shows, costs per dwelling rose 
substantially for higher flats, even when examined in terms of total costs to develop 
(inclusive of land). 
Dunleavy estimated that if the money spent on municipal flats of five or more storeys 
had been spent on two-storey three bed houses, over 37 per cent more dwellings could have 
been built for the same cost, while the average dwelling size would have been over 30 per 
cent larger (though he acknowledges that the heavy weighting of London in the data 
exaggerates the cost saving).
64
 However, the ultimate cost differential is much higher, as such 
estimates do not take into account the far greater maintenance costs of high flats built using 
industrialised methods and, critically, their much shorter lifespans. 
High-density flats were sometimes justified in terms of preserving agricultural land.
65
 
However, there was no economic case for such arguments. Over the decade from 1955 
British agricultural land contracted by only around one per cent, while net agricultural output 
Page 15 of 39
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fbsh  Email: FBSH-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk
Business History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
16 
 
rose by more than 30 per cent. While farmland was typically worth £250 per acre (or £5,000-
10,000 per acre with planning permission), the cost of `saving’ an acre of land by building at 
higher densities was put at over £30,000.
66
 Furthermore, under the 1947 Town and Country 
Planning Act, local authorities could acquire land at its `existing use value’, using their 
powers of compulsory purchase, without any premium for potential development gain.  
Moreoever, there is little evidence that government really attached great importance to 
preserving agricultural land. While land conservation arguments were sometimes employed 
by ministers and MHLG officials to justify high flat development to third parties, this was 
rarely mentioned in internal MHLG policy discussions, suggesting that it was more a 
legitimation device for policy than a core driver. The Treasury was even less keen on 
supporting agriculture. A 1955 Treasury working party rejected both the balance of payments 
and strategic arguments for supporting agriculture, while three years later, R.W.B. Clarke 
described agricultural subsidies as the `biggest government expenditure scandal’.
67
  
Glendenning and Muthesius reject claims that local decisions to build high flats were 
driven primarily by the extra subsidies available.
 
 Nor do they accept that the 1956 subsidy 
change increased incentives to build high (while qualifying this with a statement that their 
study did not discuss building costs).
68
 They further argue that there is no firm evidence that 
multi-storey building was consistently more profitable for contractors than low blocks of 
flats.
 69
 However, the MHLG and Treasury documents examined in this study contradict their 
claims. Even prior to the 1956 subsidy changes the MHLG’s Principal Private Secretary, J.E. 
Beddoe, noted that the subsidy system encouraged local authorities to build flats even when 
housing densities did not require this. For example, Birmingham had built 180 flats in six-
storey blocks, at a density of only 57 rooms per acre, that could have been met using 
conventional houses.
70
 The more generous 1956 high flat subsidies were specifically 
designed to incentivise councils to build high. In response to criticism by the Parliamentary 
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Secretary regarding the high costs per room, and per square foot, of tower blocks at Sefton 
Park, Liverpool, Beddoe reminded him that using higher subsidies to encourage high flat 
development (which was inherently more expensive), was a specific aim of the new subsidy 
regime.
71
  
 While low density overspill developments were more cost-effective, this was not the 
key factor determining policy. As Beddoe noted, `The arguments for encouraging high flat 
building… rest largely on political and social grounds.’
72
 He spelled these out in a separate 
memorandum as being: `to reduce overspill problems as much as we can. This is because the 
practical and financial problems associated with overspill are so intractable (to which I might 
add the political ones… all reception areas are ex-hypothesi Conservative seats, and usually 
marginal). The purpose was also to encourage high building for its own sake’.
73
  
However, while the 1956 progressive height subsidy increased the proportion of total 
building costs paid by central government for higher flats, local authorities still had to pay 
more per dwelling for high flats than for low-rise developments. This is illustrated in a 1959 
Treasury analysis, summarised in Table 1. The capitalised value of central government 
housing subsidies rose from 31 per cent of development costs for 4 storey blocks to 38 per 
cent for blocks of 6-8 stories and 43 per cent for blocks of more than 12 storeys. Yet, despite 
the higher proportionate subsidy, the capitalised value of the local authority contribution for 
flats of over five stories was significantly larger than for four storey blocks. Councils did not, 
therefore, face a cost imperative (or even a cost saving) to build high. 
[Table 1 near here] 
Information on the relative profitability of high flat development for contractors, 
compared to other forms of public sector housing, is more fragmentary. However, available 
evidence indicates that public sector flat development, particularly high flats, was unusually 
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lucrative. For example. a November 1954 Wimpey minute noted that their `no fines’ building 
system provided them with a margin of 14 percent, which was exceptionally high for 
contracting work.
74
 Moreover, the fact that the major contracting companies had the 
resources to generously finance networks of local and regional PR firms, that in turn provided 
lavish hospitality and other incentives to councillors and council officials, is itself an 
indication of the substantial margins available on high flat contracts.
75
 
 The cost premium for high flats is, of course, only half the story – it has to be weighed 
against the utility derived from them relative to lower-rise housing. Studies consistently 
pointed to inferior outcomes for tenants in tower blocks relative to conventional housing or 
low-rise flats.
76
 Moreover, evidence for negative tenant impacts, especially for young 
children, was already available by the mid-1950s.  For example, a MHLG memorandum of 
January 1954 noted that a recent Central Housing Advisory Committee report had found high 
flats to be unsuitable for children.
77
  While policy-makers assumed that families with young 
children would be given flats on the lower floors, this proved impracticable – as the 
proportion of re-housed families with children exceeded their availability. Moreover, given 
the limited supply of housing it generally proved impractical to move tenants to lower floors 
when they came to have children.
78
  
Subsequent studies generally corroborated these findings.
79
 Pre-school children were 
shown to be particularly disadvantaged, as they lacked spaces for interaction with other 
children of their own age, with potentially permanent adverse impacts on their social 
development. Mothers typically prevented young children from playing on external balconies 
owing to safety fears, while outdoor play areas were difficult for parents to observe, were 
typically unsupervised, and were often perceived as being unsafe. This contrasted with the 
private gardens or enclosed areas adjoining conventional housing, where, `they can be left to 
play in safety with little or no supervision.’
80
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Studies also highlighted negative health impacts. Many adults (especially mothers) 
were found to have high incidences of stress, depression, and other psychological problems 
attributed to environmental factors associated with high-flat living.
81
 Meanwhile children, in 
particular, were subject to unusually high incidences of respiratory infections, reflecting 
problems of dampness caused by poorly-fitted pre-fabricated building components, together 
with tower blocks’ typically high heating costs and poor insulation (even by the standards of 
the time).
82
   
Successive social surveys indicated that 80 – 98 per cent of working people would 
prefer a house to a flat (at equivalent rents).
83
 Again, this information was available at an 
early stage. For example, in 1957 Birmingham’s Housing Manager, John P Macey, told a 
Royal Institute of British Architects symposium on family life in high-density housing that 80 
per cent of prospective tenants would rather live in a house than a flat. Evidence also 
consistently showed that most council tenants preferred to be allocated a traditional inter-war 
council house than a modern flat (sometimes overturning official council policy that the best 
tenants should be allocated to their new accommodation).
84
  
Indeed, despite the housing shortage, by the early 1970s there were reports of some 
councils having difficulties finding tenants for new high-rise blocks.
85
 Social problems and 
tenant dissatisfaction typically grew over the lifetime of each completed development, 
accentuated by the rapid physical deterioration of many tall blocks and consequent problems 
of dampness, cold, and poor accessibility (owing to lifts being frequently out of service), 
which in turn led to the flight of those tenants able to access better accommodation and their 
replacement by a growing proportion of `problem families’ and associated problems of anti-
social behaviour, vandalism, and crime.
86
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Explaining local authorities’ acceptance of high flat development 
 The above analysis has shown that while central government heavily subsidised high 
flats, the subsidies were insufficient to make tower blocks cost-competitive with low-rise 
flats or houses, from a local authority perspective. This begs the question why there was so 
little political opposition to central government policy – with the new 1964 Labour 
government actually championing current policy during its first year in office?  
 While Conservative governments had prioritised blocking population overspill of 
urban (and often Labour voting) families into rural and suburban areas, urban councils also 
had a political incentive to keep their voters within their boundaries.
87
 However, in most 
cases this could have been achieved without high-rise developments, given that inner-urban 
housing estates were typically at densities that did not require tower blocks. In order to 
understand the strong local government support for tower blocks, it is necessary to examine 
the close links between politicians and contractors (or their agents) that emerged particularly 
during the third industrialised building drive. 
The push for industrialised building involved collaboration between central 
government, local government, and a relatively small group of national contractors, with 
whom they developed close, informal, relationships. Such relatio ships are analogous to 
those between governments and military equipment suppliers. In western market economies 
defence contractors devote considerable resources to cultivating close relationships with 
procurement agencies, to secure higher volumes of orders and higher prices for those 
contracts. Strategies aimed at achieving this include forging strong personal ties with senior 
military personnel and ministers; providing them with business services; and offering 
entertainment and gifts, together with lucrative directorships or consultancy positions.
88
 
Page 20 of 39
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fbsh  Email: FBSH-peerreview@journals.tandf.co.uk
Business History
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
21 
 
A number of senior Conservative ministers had strong links with building contractors. 
Keith Joseph was a former chairman of Bovis and his Minister of Public Buildings and 
Works, Geoffrey Rippon, was a director of Cubitts. Meanwhile several big contractors, 
including McAlpine and Taylor Woodrow, were major contributors to the Conservative Party 
and other right-wing bodies. Dame Evelyn Sharp was a close friend of the developer Neil 
Wates and was appointed as a director of Bovis on her retirement by Keith Joseph.
89
 And in 
1962 Albert Costain relinquished directorships of Costain-associated companies, when he 
was appointed Principal Private Secretary to Geoffrey Rippon. None of these arrangements 
may have broken any formal or unwritten rules of conduct, though the fact that Construction 
News carried an article on these and a string of other Tory Ministers and MPs who were 
directors of building-related firms under the title, `Do contractors need an MP on the board?’, 
suggests that the trade considered they provided a competitive advantage.
90
  
 Such relationships created potential conflicts of interest. For example, in May 1963 
Newcastle’s Conservatives had demanded a public inquiry into potential corruption in the 
awarding of three blocks of municipal flats to the contractors Crudens, (involving the 
architect John Poulson and the local Labour politician T. Dan Smith). However, Smith also 
had strong links with Bovis and – according to Fitzwalter and Taylor - the possibility of 
damage to Bovis’s reputation put the Minister, Sir Keith Joseph – who refused to pursue the 
matter – in a very embarrassing position.
91
 
However it was principally the links between local politicians and major system-build 
contractors that were dramatically illuminated by the housing corruption trials of the 1970s 
(though a number of national politicians, including household names, were said to be `lucky’ 
to have avoided prosecution). These mainly related to tower blocks developed during the 
1960s building drive, where the major contractors used `hard sell’ marketing techniques, 
promoted by `door to door salesmen’.
92
 Councillors and council officials were offered 
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various inducements, including lavish business entertainment and expenses-paid trips 
(sometimes overseas) to see the contractors’ systems in situ. These were increasingly 
organised by PR firms and consultancies, sometimes run by major local government figures 
such as T. Dan Smith (who pioneered this approach). Meanwhile the shift from open 
tendering to negotiated housing contracts opened the door to corruption, as a few key people– 
usually the council leader, the chairman of the housing committee, the local authority 
architect and the town clerk – enjoyed great discretionary power regarding which firms were 
awarded the contracts.
93
  
Despite mounting evidence of pervasive malpractice, revealed by a series of high 
profile criminal trials, the 1974-9 Labour government persistently refused widespread calls 
for a general enquiry into local authority corruption in building contracts, or more specific 
enquiries regarding particular local authorities.
94
 However, the ubiquity of bribery is reflected 
in the fact that one of the Trustees in Bankruptcy’s concerns about John Poulson’s tax returns 
was, `That whereas it was well known that architects  got “kick backs” from contractors there 
was a noticeable absence of such receipts by Poulson...’
95
 Indeed perhaps the most atypical 
characteristic of the two most notorious figures of the corruption scandal  - John Poulson and 
T. Dan Smith (whose activities were fictionalised in the seminal BBC drama series Our 
Friends in the North), was their practice of keeping extensive records, even after Poulson’s 
bankruptcy, which considerably eased the police’s job of pursuing charges that would 
otherwise have been difficult to prove.
96
 
Those cases that did come to court revealed networks of PR companies working for 
building contractors (who – it was stressed during the trials – were not necessarily aware of 
their business practices). The PR agencies in turn either hired councillors and council 
officials, or offered them inducements.
97
 For example, Maurice Byrne, a former mayor of 
Pontefract, informed Leeds Crown Court how, as public relations officer for the London-
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based building firm Carlton Contractors (a subsidiary of the Trafalgar House Group), he gave 
`backhanders’ of up to £1,000 to officials and councillors. Byrne, who pleaded guilty to ten 
charges of corruption, defended his behaviour by stating that backhanders were `the order of 
the day’ in local authority contracting.
98
  
Another case revealed how Birmingham Council’s dominant contractor, Bryants, 
lavished hospitality, `Christmas gifts’ and other presents, such as holiday accommodation, on 
councillors and officials in the West Midlands, with a list of recipients that contained some 
2,000 names by 1968-9.
99
 Birmingham’s chief architect, Alan Maudsley, together with two 
colleagues, were arrested on various charges  and, following their early guilty plea for 
conspiracy to corrupt, a further case led to Maurice Barwick (Bryants’ former managing 
director), and two other ex-directors, pleading guilty on 28 counts of corruption.
100
   
Yet it was the trials of John Poulson and his associates that captured the public 
spotlight. Poulson had pioneered the development of an integrated construction practice that 
combined the disciplines of the architect, engineer, and quantity surveyor, at a reduced fee. 
Police enquiries indicated that in the early-mid 1960s his organisation was highly regarded by 
hospital planners. However, as he expanded into other areas of public sector building he 
became increasingly reliant on what eventually became industrial-scale bribery.
101
 This was 
organised by a string of PR firms, headed by leading figures in local politics, such as T. Dan 
Smith. The `Poulson scandal’ began in early 1970 with two separate police investigations into 
corruption in local authority contracting in Wandsworth and Bradford.
102
 This eventually led 
to 21 people being convicted on corruption charges, including prominent civil servants, local 
councillors, and council officials. In total 300 individuals had been short-listed for 
investigation (some avoiding prosecution by leaving the country).
103
 The scandal also ended 
the careers of three MP’s including Home Secretary Reginald Maudling. These escaped 
prosecution partly owing to a legal opinion that MPs were exempt from the corruption acts. 
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Moreover, in the 1970s prosecuting a former senior minister such as Maudling required a far 
higher evidence standard than that for ordinary mortals. As the Director of Public 
Prosecutions’ legal counsel, John Cobb, told his colleagues, `Given the nature of the man,’ he 
would only proceed if given, `a one hundred per cent, copper-bottomed guarantee of 
winning’.
104
  
The end of the high flats era 
 Industrialised building methods peaked at 42 per cent of new public sector housing 
development in 1969, but then fell sharply to only 5 per cent by 1977.
105
 In addition to the 
corruption scandals, the early 1970s also witnessed rising popular resistance to 
`comprehensive redevelopment’ of inner-urban residential areas and growing perceptions of 
the negative environmental characteristics of tower blocks and high-density council estates. 
However, many local authorities had already lost confidence in high-flats, at least in part 
owing to the Ronan Point disaster. Ronan Point - a 22-storey block of flats owned by the 
London Borough of Newham – was constructed by Taylor Woodrow-Anglian Ltd, using the 
Larsen Nielsen system of large concrete panel construction. On May 16
th
 1968, two months 
after completion, a gas explosion in an 18
th
 floor flat caused the `progressive collapse’ of the 
whole southeast corner of the block, with 22 flats destroyed, four people killed, and 17 
injured. At the subsequent tribunal Taylor Woodrow-Anglian claimed this was a major blast, 
with a force of 600 pounds per square inch. However, structural engineers appointed by the 
Treasury solicitor estimated that the flats had failed at an explosive pressure of only 3 pounds 
per square inch (an average domestic gas explosion). The enquiry’s report found that a 
structural flaw inherent in the building system had made it vulnerable to progressive collapse, 
not only from explosions, but from fire or even high winds.
106
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The collapse of local authority confidence stemmed not directly from the Ronan Point 
failure, but from the fact that councils were left to foot much of the bill for remedial work 
necessary to strengthen similar blocks, together with lost rental income during the work and 
replacement costs for all gas appliances (deemed dangerous in such blocks even after 
strengthening). At least 1,893 blocks of flats, comprising 127,585 dwellings, were found to 
require strengthening, at a cost of around £30 million (£426 million in 2016 prices).
107
  
June 1969 saw an ill-tempered meeting between the Minister of Housing and his 
officials, and representatives of local government associations. These pressed the government 
to meet the costs of remedial work, stressing that they had been `pressurized’ into using 
system building - Circular 21/65 made this a quid pro quo for being granted generous housing 
allocations.
108
 The Minister countered that, `Authorities had never been “pressurized” into 
using high system built flats’ – though MHLG records contain repeated references to a policy 
of pressurising councils to do so.
109
 Mr Ward of the MHLG also argued that government 
sponsorship of system building, `had been done in the interests of all housing authorities, 
with the object of getting more houses built with the resources available.’
110
 This again 
appears disingenuous, given that industrialised techniques were recognised by MHLG as 
being more expensive than traditional methods.  
An initial government offer to pay for 40 per cent of the strengthening work for 
blocks of over six storeys was later raised to 50 per cent.
111
 However, the local authorities 
(some of which faced significant rent and rate rises to cover the remaining strengthening 
costs, plus lost rents and appliance replacements) remained deeply unhappy.
112
 Attempts to 
secure any financial contribution from the contractors proved fruitless. The diffusion of 
responsibility for design between the contractors, design engineers, local authority engineers, 
and Building Regulations, made it very difficult to pin down financial liability. Ironically, in 
some cases (such as Taylor Woodrow Anglian’s blocks at Newham) the contractors had to be 
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paid further substantial sums to strengthen their own developments - as they were the 
licensees of the specific building systems.
113
 Much remedial work was said to have been 
carried out with a similarly cavalier approach to that of the original construction, eventually 
leading to further expensive maintenance work, or early demolition.
114
  
By the 1980s changes to the skyline regarding tower blocks generally involved their 
demolition, rather than construction.
115
 This was a far cry from what the government intended 
when it set the yardstick for industrialised building system approvals on the basis that they 
were `sound and suitable for a 60 year loan sanction,’
116
 and contrasts sharply with the legacy 
of conventional semi-detached inter-war and post-war council houses, which have typically 
yielded long service lives with low depreciation and substantial rental value growth. 
Conclusion 
 The above evidence shows that tower block development was not a policy `mistake’, 
in that it achieved the aims of the Conservative governments that launched the policy – to 
corral urban working class families within their existing boundaries and prevent substantial 
overspill into surrounding areas that might erode Conservatives support (both through the 
inflow of Labour voters and the alienation of Conservative voters opposed to overspill into 
their `back yard’). Strong advocacy of high-rise housing projects by the architectural and 
planning professions had thus acted to `legitimise’ a policy deemed expedient on party-
political grounds. This also served to concentrate public housing contracts among a small 
number of national building firms, as – while many local builders could tender for 
conventional public housing – relatively few had expertise in large-scale industrialised 
building systems. The policy achieved these objectives, but at huge economic and social 
costs, particularly for the tenants of these blocks and their children.  
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Given Britain’s pluralistic democratic system, it might have been expected that this 
policy would have been resisted by the Labour Party and (predominantly Labour) urban 
councils. However, there was remarkably little such opposition– so little that the new 1964 
Labour government initially pressed for an intensification of high-rise system building. The 
above analysis partially corroborates Dunleavy’s findings that political opposition was 
diffused by the presentation of high-rise system building as a technological short-cut to 
solving the housing problem, together with generous grant subsidies. However, we show that, 
contrary to the findings of previous studies, local councils still faced higher costs per 
dwelling for high-rise flats than for conventional housing or low-rise flats.  
Urban councils accepted system-built tower blocks partly because this maintained 
their political constituencies in situ, but also, increasingly, because of the close relationships 
between those councillors and officials who controlled the local planning process and the 
small group of major contractors (or their agents) that dominated system building. As such, 
the tower block era was essentially the product of a national government pursuing its party-
political interests and local (and, to some extent, national) politicians pursuing their personal 
financial interests. However, between 1965 and early 1970s this alignment of interests 
collapsed. The new Labour government had realised the poor cost-effectiveness of high-rise 
industrial building by the end of its first year in office and introduced legislation that would 
remove much of the extra subsidies for high flats. The aftermath of the Ronan Point disaster 
illustrated the financial vulnerability of councils that embraced high-rise housing solutions, 
while the corruption scandals of the early 1970s spotlighted the vulnerability of politicians 
and public servants to criminal investigation. Meanwhile a growing public backlash against 
comprehensive redevelopment of inner-urban areas, high flat construction, and modernist 
architecture, fatally weakened the legitimising influence of the architectural and planning 
professions.
117
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Britain’s high-rise era had important long-term consequences for the residualisation 
and stigmatisation of council housing. From the early 1970s a growing number of councils 
faced difficulties finding tenants for high flats and increasingly resorted to moving in tenants 
from `sink’ estates. This led to a growing association of tower blocks with `problem’ tenants 
as (for example in Birmingham) certain blocks would only be accepted by those really 
desperate for accommodation.
118
 Adverse tenant selection (and associated problems of 
vandalism, crime, and anti-social behaviour) were compounded by the rapid physical 
deterioration of many tower blocks. These included limited structural failures (of external 
panels and similar components);
 
dampness; problems with lifts; and unreliable and/or costly 
utilities.
119
  
Renovation to modern standards was often impracticable, owing to inherent design 
flaws, or poor specifications (such as only a single staircase for exit in the event of fire).
120
 
However, the main constraints were financial, given the scale of the potential maintenance 
bills facing many councils with substantial stocks of high flats. These increasingly opted for 
short-term `patching-up’ solutions, such as the installation of cheap external cladding. Even 
the 2009 Lakanal House fire in Camberwell, London, which left six people dead, and an 
inquest verdict that highlighted botched renovations, failed to bring about recommended 
improvements which might have prevented the much more severe Grenfell Tower tragedy in 
June 2017, where at least 71 people lost their lives. 
While tower blocks were a disaster from an economic and social perspective, they 
served (and, arguably, continues to serve) the agendas of those vested interests behind the 
policy. The Conservative governments’ policy of fencing working-class populations within 
existing urban boundaries prevented any substantial dilution of Conservative majorities in 
suburban and rural areas vulnerable to over-spill; while both central and local government 
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politicians and officials could claim to be addressing the housing problem, while quietly 
reaping private financial rewards from contractors whose success was dependent on their 
support. Meanwhile the small group of contractors who dominated system-building used this 
episode to transform themselves into highly-profitable multinational companies and have 
since retained their dominant position in public-sector contracting.
121
 Britain’s tower-bock 
era thus serves as a salutary example of how co-operative alignments of political and 
corporate interests may lead to policies that have severe economic and social costs, not only 
during their implementation, but for later generations.   
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Table 1: Government housing subsidies per flat, for flats in blocks of four or more storeys, c. 
1959 
 
Height Annual 
subsidy 
Capitalised 
value 
Total cost 
to develop
Capitalised 
value/total 
cost 
Cost to 
local 
authority
Storeys £ £ £  % £  
4 32 528 1,693       31 1,168    
5 38 626 1,829       34 1,207    
6-8 50-53.5 855* 2,258       38 1,400    
9-11 55.25-58.75 940** 2,221       42 1,288    
12 or more 60.5 1,000 2,308       43 1,316     
 
Source: TNA, T 227/830, document on capitalised values of principal housing subsidies n.d., 
c. February 1960. 
Notes: Subsidies are payable over 60 years; capitalised on the basis of the Public Works Loan 
Board interest rate (5.875 per cent). Total cost to develop based on data for 1st January 1958 
to 30th June 1959.  * For a seven storey flat.  ** For a 10 storey flat. 
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1 
 
Figure 1: High-rise flat tender approvals in England and Wales, number, and proportion of 
total local authority dwelling approvals, 1953 – 1975 
 
Source: adapted from: Dunleavy, Politics of Mass Housing, 41.  
Note: High-rise flats are defined as those of five or more storeys. 
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